Five
months after terrorist attacks brought down the
World Trade Center towers, destroyed a section
of the Pentagon and shattered Americans' illusion
of homeland safety, they find themselves in a
position much of the world knows well they
don't know where they're going, when they'll get
there or
what might happen on the way. Nor can they yet
count the full cost of where they've been.
This
is a new and fearful situation for Americans -- traditionally
sheltered behind guardian oceans and unthreatening
neighbors, enjoying in recent years unequalled prosperity,
military power and world influence, accustomed to
a broad range of political freedoms and confident
in a relatively settled future.
Now innocent thousands are dead, prominent
symbols of power have been ravished, the
anthrax scare has exposed another vulnerability,
the economy has gone into tailspin, the federal
surplus has vanished, political activity
is only beginning to revive, and civil libertarians
are crying alarm.
Americans can take little comfort, moreover,
from two prominent, related post-Sept. 11
developments -- the systematic and seemingly
easy triumph of American arms over the Taliban
government of Afghanistan; the escape of
Osama bin Laden, the master mind behind the
Sept. 11 attacks.
The
liberation of Afghanistan from a repressive
regime
appears to have been worth doing in
itself, without reference to the overall "war
on terrorism." But its consequences
are not entirely clear: Even the awesome
display of U. S. military power surely came
as no great revelation to the rest of the
world.
How
long and how well can a negotiated compromise
government control a tribally divided, traditionally
warlike land? Already signs of "security" problems
are raising the specter of a Western military
occupation of Afghanistan, with all its difficulties,
and which in turn could affect the ultimate
attitude of the Islamic world.
Where,
moreover, will the war on terrorism next
be prosecuted?
Public and internal Administration
support for moving on to the destruction
of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq seems
to have faded, at least for the moment. No
real evidence of Iraqi participation in the
Sept.11 attacks has been brought out ; substantial
opposition in the Arab world could be expected;
and the necessary public support for turning
American firepower on Iraq, without specific
cause, might be difficult to arouse. If,
however, after the conquest of Afghanistan
the war on terrorism appears to languish,
with no definable enemy and while the national
outrage at the Sept. 11 attacks gradually
declines, even if the ultimate terrorist
threat remains, how long can a war effort
and a war psychology not to mention
such inconveniences as heightened airline
security precautions-- be sustained?
Long
ago, in the great public resistance that
eventually
developed against the "police
action" in Korea and the war in Vietnam,
it was established that Americans had little
liking for fighting small foreign wars that
held no ultimate promise of bringing victory
in the larger Cold War. This time, no one
has even suggested that "terrorism" can
be wiped out in one stroke, or a few; indeed,
President Bush has warned that the current
war probably will take a long time to complete.
At some point, therefore, the public might
reasonably ask.: war against whom?
As
for Osama bin Laden, his apparent escape
from Afghanistan
(to where?) underlines one
of the great remaining questions from Sept.
11 were the devastating attacks of
that day essentially a single-shot assault
designed for maximum effect? Or were they
the first of an equally well-planned series?
Even if only the former, their startling
success seems likely to encourage Osama bin
Laden to try again, somewhere, sometime,
sooner rather than later, on an equally devastating
scale. His capture would not necessarily
have removed the pervasive American fear
of a new terrorist strike, since his Al Queda
organization and perhaps other leaders could
have carried on the terrorist campaign. But
Osama bin Laden in the grave or in prison
would have removed at least one known threat
from a murky scene.
"In the grave," U. S. officials
and much of the public seem to prefer. Not
only do the wholesale deaths of Sept.11 seem
to many Americans to cry out for that kind
of justice. But if the terrorist leader were
to be captured alive, numerous difficult
questions would arise: How would he be tried?
Where? Before what kind of tribunal? How
would Islam react to a court-ordered rather
than a battlefield death? How would Americans
react to anything less than a death sentence?
But if such a penalty were assured, could
the proceeding be labeled or seen by the
world as a "fair trial"?
Of more immediate concern is the U. S. economy.
Already slowing down when those hijacked
aircraft smashed into the World Trade Center,
an overvalued economy hamstrung by bloated
business inventories and lack of demand inevitably
sank further, perhaps literally into recession.
Consumer and producer confidence declined,
the stock market (its Wall Street location
physically damaged by the Sept. 11 attacks)
reacted downward, and some industries (particularly
the airlines and tourism generally) were
badly hit.
Signs
of economic speed-up are emerging but Alan
Greenspan, the chairman of the Federal
Reserve Board, has warned that recovery is
not "just around the corner" and
certainly is not s yet assured.
President
Bush, who never had the traditional political "honeymoon" after his
disputed election, got it with interest after
Sept 11. Rallying round the flag and the
President, as Americans always do when challenged
internationally, Bush in the last months
of 2001 established himself forcefully as
the national leader, as he had not quite
been able to do earlier in his Administration.
For weeks, he governed with virtually no
political opposition; and his military leadership,
together with that of Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld, earned broad approval and
was vindicated in Afghanistan.
Some
of Bush's domestic moves notably
his ruling that terrorists captured abroad
would face military tribunals without some
accustomed legal protections aroused
much criticism from lawyers and libertarians
but appeared to have strong public support.
Not until the Senate, late in 2001, refused
a Republican economic "stimulus" regarded
by Democrats as top-heavy with tax cuts for
the rich did the President suffer a
real challenge.
Then,
in January 2002, another sign of renewed
political
opposition appeared when the Senate
Majority Leader, Tom Daschle, Democrat of
South Dakota, attacked the Bush tax cuts
of 2001 which mostly will take effect
in later years -- as primarily responsible
for the disappearance of the federal surplus.
Republicans generally attribute the vanished
surplus to the astronomical costs incurred
owing to the terrorist attacks, and to the
decline of the economy and consequent federal
revenues. Daschle's speech foretold a continuing
partisan political struggle on the question
of economic stimulus and how best to achieve
it, as well as a possible effort to repeal
some or all of the tax cuts an effort
which the Republicans and perhaps the President
are sure to label "raising taxes." It
signaled the beginning of the end, moreover,
of Bush's belated, war-inspired honeymoon
(except on specific war measures, where he
appears still an actual commander-in-chief).
And it sounded perhaps the opening gong of
the 2004 presidential campaign, with Daschle
himself likely to be among the most active
Democratic challengers.
Bush's high personal standing and job performance
rating in national polls, as well as the
substantial success he can claim as a war
President, might appear to make him safe
for re-election in three years. Both he and
the Democrats know, however, that the same
thing was said of his father, the first President
Bush, in 1991 after victory in the short
and bloodless (on the American side) Gulf
War. Both recall, too, that Bush was defeated
a year later by Bill Clinton of Arkansas.
(So swiftly and inexorably do modern, television-driven
politics move, that barely a decade later
both the elder Bush and Clinton are nearly
invisible on the national scene -- or screen.)
The
present Bush faces politically, moreover,
the problem
discussed above of sustaining
a war with no specific enemy, no settled
venue and only the most elusive objective:
the destruction of "terrorism," or
as Bush likes to put it even less specifically, "evil-doers".
Depending on how he handles that question,
he might bring an end to the fragile international
coalition that now supports the war on terrorism,
as well as fracture his support at home.
Like
all presidents, notably his father, he's
also
dependent on an uncertain economy
that he can influence but not control. While
so far little damaged by the Enron debacle,
his established connection to the failed
Houston energy giant might yet spiral down
into the kind of "scandal" political
opponents well know how to exploit. (Think
Clinton and Whitewater, whatever that was.)
Bush already is suffering criticism that
under cover of a war emergency, he is attempting
to impose on the country some elements of
his pre-Sept. 11 agenda particularly
environmental.
A
wide-ranging investigation of the obvious
intelligence
failure of Sept. 11 probably
is inevitable. On that point, the Bush Administration
seems little more vulnerable perhaps
not as much as its predecessors. But
such an inquiry holds the potential of laying
blame not only for the unpredicted attacks
but also for failure to make intelligence
reforms that might prevent their repetition.
Conventional politics, in short, sooner
or later will return to Washington and the
nation; and when it does, Bush the popular
wartime leader is sure to be charged by the
Democrats with being again the neo-right
wing friend of the oil industry and the wealthy
that they described for most of 2001.
Meanwhile,
all the other challenges of an uncertain
new century confront not only Bush
but the American people and those of the
world. The economy of Argentina collapsed
and its government now under a third
President in a few weeks defaulted
on $141 billion of international debt. This
is likely to be damaging to economies in
Europe and the U. S., as were recent problems
in Indonesia, and may further lower confidence
in the policies of the International Monetary
Fund which failed to solve the Argentine
crisis.
In
the Middle East, a settlement even
an easing of the bloody struggle between
Israel and the Palestinians seems no nearer;
nor can the outside world look with much
confidence on either Ariel Sharon, Israel's
prime minister, or Yassir Arafat, the leader
of the Palestinian authority. American pronouncements
of marginal gains in the all-but-abandoned "peace
process" sound more and more like whistling
past the graveyard.
In Southeast Asia, the uneasy India-Pakistan
relationship and their long-dormant rivalry
over Kashmir has escalated to the verge of
open warfare. Pakistan, so far, has been
a mainstay of support for the U.S. in the
war against the Taliban in Afghanistan; but
that relationship surely would be affected,
probably adversely, if Pakistan and India
were to become engaged in armed hostilities.
Asia might also be most severely affected
if the Bush Administration perseveres in
its expensive plan to develop and deploy
a national missile defense. Among other repercussions,
that might well cause China to build up its
presently limited missile force, in which
case China's traditional rival, India, would
have to react. That in turn would cause Pakistan
to take alarm and join in a Southeast Asian
arms race.
The
Bush plan suffered a recent setback in
American
politics, however, when a new
national intelligence estimate in effect
downgraded the threat of a missile attack
on the U.S. As the Washington Post reported
the new estimate compiled by the CIA
and 10 other agencies of the intelligence
community it predicted that "the
United States is more likely to suffer a
nuclear, chemical or biological attack from
terrorists using ships, trucks or airplanes
than one by a foreign country using long-range
missiles."
While
not ruling out the possibility of a missile
attack, the intelligence estimate
partially contradicted what has been a primary
argument of the Bush Administration on behalf
of a missile defense the likelihood
that a "rogue state," such as Iraq,
North Korea or Iran, might be able fairly
soon to launch a nuclear missile capable
of reaching the U. S. specifically,
in the case of North Korea, hitting Alaska.
So far, the Bush Administration has said
nothing to indicate that this report will
cause it to retreat from missile defense.
Together, however, with the fact that the
catastrophic attacks of Sept. 11 were carried
out by hijacked aircraft rather than by missiles,
the new intelligence estimate may damage
public support for expending huge sums on
an as-yet-unproven technology, to guard against
an unproven threat.. Not all the world's
news since Sept. 11 has been bad. In Europe,
the new Euro currency has been introduced,
not without problems, but with apparent general
acceptance. Jesse Helms of North Carolina
entered his last year in the U.S. Senate
and on the Foreign Relations Committee. The
Olympic games will go on in Salt Lake City
as scheduled, and an asteroid big enough
to turn Texas into a crater missed hitting
the earth by a half-million miles.
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